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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
)

OFTHE

STATE OF UTAH
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
RICH COUNTY SCHOOL
:l)ISTRICT,
Plaintiff

vs
·EARL F. PASSEY, CLERK,
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
RICH COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT
Defendent

PLAINTIFF'S
BRIEF

ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH
Appearing as Attorneys for Plaintiff
1409 Walker Bank Building,
Salt Lak~ City, Utab,
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
RICH COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Plaintiff

vs
EARL F. PASSEY, CLERK,
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
RICH COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT

PLAINTIFF'S
BRIEF

Defendent

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for a writ of mandamus to be
issued by this court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article 8 of the Utah
Constitution as shown by the complaint filed in this
cause. Plaintiff Board of Education has duly and
legally performed all acts required by Chapter 13 of
Title 75 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, to be done
prior to the issuance of $185,000 School Building
Bonds by said Board (including the holding of an
election on May 15, 1951, and the passing of a resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds). DefenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dant, the Clerk of said Board, failed and refused to
sign said bonds to the amount of $162,000 and as a
result plaintiff board is unable to sell them. The
purpose of this action is to obtain an order of the
court requiring defendant to sign said bonds.
Defendants' reason for failing and refusing to
sign the aforementioned bonds is his belief that they
represent an excess of indebtedness on the part of the
school district above and beyond its legal limitation.
The assessed value of the taxable property in Rich
County School District is ( $2,870,761,) as determined by the last (the 1951) assessment. This
figure is 40% of $7,176,902.50, that being the
amount determined by the Assessor to be the reasonable fair cash value thereof. Four per cent of the
first figure is $114,830.44, whereas four per cent of
the second is $287,076.10. The total outstanding
debt, exclusive of the issue here in question is
$86,400, which added to the $185,000 issue in controversy amounts to $271,400.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

Utah Statute as amended provides the debt limitation of a school district shall be four per cent of
one hundred per cent (100%) of the reasonable
fair cash value of taxable property within the
school district.

2.

The Utah statute as amended does not violate the
constitution of Utah for the word "value" as
used in the constitution means the reasonable
fair cash value.
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3.

The total debt of the district, including, the
aforesaid bonds, will not exceed the satutory
limit of four per cent of the reasonable fair cash
value of the property in the district.
ARGUMENT

The applicable statutory provision is section 7513-12 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the pertin-ent part of which, as amended by Chapter 84 of the
Laws of Utah, 1951, reads as follows:
"The board shall also file with said clerk a
statement showing the approximate number of
inhabitants and the value of taxable property
in the district, that the amount of bonds proposed to be issued, including existing indebtedness, does not exceed four per cent of one
hundred per cent ( 100%) of the reasonable fair
cash value of taxable property in school districts
of cities of the first class or four per cent of one
hundred per cent ( 100%) of the reasonable fair
cash value of taxable property in all other school
districts, that the election at which the question
of issuing bonds was submitted was lawfully
called and held, that all proceedings in relation
to the proposed issue of bonds in said district
were lawfully conducted, and that such bonds
may be lawfully issued." (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the 1951 amendment, this part of the statute
read:
"The board shall also file with said clerk a
statement showing the approximate number of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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inhabitants and the value of taxable property in
the district, that the amount of bonds proposed
to be issued, including existing indebtedness,
does not exceed three per cent of the value of
taxable property in school districts of cities of
the first class or four per cent of the value of
taxable property in all other school districts,
that the election at which the question of issuing
bonds wes submitted was lawfully called and
held, that all proceedings in relation to the proposed issue of bonds in said district were lawfully conducted, and that such bonds may be lawfully issued." (Emphasis supplied)
Defendent does not deny that the bonds sought ·
to be issued by plaintiff board will fall within the
limit prescribed by the statute as amended, but he
asserts that the amendment violates the Constitution
of Utah in establishing as a basis for computing the
four per cent debt limit, "one hundred per cent
( 100%) of the reasonable fair cash value" rather
than the assessed valuation as shown on the assessment rolls. The issue presented to the court is the
determination of the exact limit to which the plaintiff may incur indebtedness under the Utah Constitution.
Article 14, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution
reads in part as follows :
"When authorized to create indebtedness as
provided in Section 3 of this Article, no county
shall become indebted to an amount, including
existing indebtedness exceeding two per centum.
No city, town, school district or other municipal corporation, shall become indebted to an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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amount, including existing indebtedness, exceeding four per centum of the value of the taxable property therein, the value to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and County
purposes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness;"
This provision was in said section at the time of the
adoption of the constitution in 1895 and has been included therein ever since. The problem involved
here is the determination of the meaning of the words
"the value of the taxable property therein, the value
to be ascertained by the last assessment for State
and County purposes, previous to the incurring of
such indebtedness." It is contended by the defendent
that this language means the assessed valuation as
shown on the assessment rolls of the County. Plaintiff, ho·wever, believes that this language should be
given the meaning intended by the framers of the
constitution: that the word "value" means full cash
value and that the assessment referred to is merely a
guide to minimize discord in the determination of
that value.
Until 1947 this question could not have arisen
because the law, now Section 80-5-1 of the Utah Code
Annotated 1943, required that all taxable property
be assessed at its full cash value. However, in 1947
this statute was amended to require that all taxable
property "be assessed at 40ro of its reasonable fair
cash value." Plaintiff's position is that this amendment to the statutory law of Utah does not change
the substance of the constitutional debt limit of the
School District.
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There is no reported Utah decision on this question but the matter has been decided by the supreme
courts of various other states. In N. W. Halsey &
Co. v. City of Belle Plaine, 104 N.W. 494 (Iowa Supreme Court, 1905) , the plain tiff was the successful
bidder for an issue of bonds of the defendent city and
brought suit to recover his earnest money on the
theory that the bonds for \Vhich he bid \vere void.
The plaintiff contended that the issuance of said
bonds would cause the debt limit of the city to be
exceeded. Section 3 of Article 11 of the Iowa Constitution read:
"No minicipal corporation shall be allowed to
become indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount in the aggregate exceeding
five per centum on the value of the taxable
property within such * * * corporation-- to be
ascertained by the last state and county tax lists,
previous to the incurring of such indebtedness."
(Emphasis supplied)

The applicable statute read:
"All property subject to taxation shall be
valued at its actual value * * * and shall be assessed at twenty-five per cent of such value.
Such assessed value shall be taken and considered as the taxable value of such property, upon
which the levy shall be made. Actual value of
property as used in this chapter shall mean its
value in the market in the ordinary course of
trade.''
at the time the bonds were sought to be issued and at
the time of the case. If the assessed valuation were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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· accepted as the "value of taxable property" referred
to in the constitution, the bonds in question would
have caused an excess of indebtedness. If, however,
the actual value of the taxable property which was
assessed legally at only twenty-five per cent of that
actual value were used as the debt basis, then there
'vould have been adequate constitutional authority
for the issuance.
At the time the Iowa Constitution was adopted,
the law making property assessments for the purposes of taxation recognized no other basis than that
of full value. Consequently the court determined
that it was this full value which the constitution intended as the basis for the determination of the debt
limit. Therefore, it was held that the bonds could be
legally issued.
It should be noted that the case of C. B. Nash Co.
v. City of Council Bluffs, 174 Fed 182 (U.S. Circuit
Court S. D. Io\va, 1909) thro,vs some doubt on the
figures but not the holding of the Belle Plaine case.
This was an equity suit to enjoin the defendant Iowa
City and officers from issuing "bonds or other obligations" in the amount of $600,00 for the purpose of
raising money to buy or construct a system of waterworks. The court was called upon to decide whether
the constitutional five per cent limitation was based
on the full value or the assessed value of the property
in the city, and brought out in its opinion that the Supreme Court of Iowa was mistaken in its figure
regarding the existing indebtedness aside from the
proposed issue in the Belle Plaine case. The case
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as reported in 104 N.W. 495 recited $8,000, and the
report of the case in 128 Iowa 467 recited $80,000.
Apparently the case was determined on an agreed
statement of facts without other testimony wherein
the existing indebtedness was agreed to be $8,000.
Subsequent to the time it vvas typed, the opinion was
changed so that it read $80,000 in the official files,
but the Federal Court held in the Nash case that no
matter what was the actual indebtedness of the city
in the Belle Plaine case, what the state court decided
was that the indebtedness should be determined according to the full valuation and, therefore, the Federal Court so held in this case.
The Belle Plaine case was followed by the Iowa
Supreme Court in Reed v. the City of Cedar Rapids,
113 N.W. 773 ( 1907) and in lVliller v. City of Glenwood, 176 N.W. 373 (1920). - In Hansen v. City of Hoquiam, 163 Pac. 391
(1917) a similar question was before the Washington Supreme Court. Section 6 of Article 8 of the
State Constitution read:
"No county, city, town, school district, or other
municipal corporation shall for any purpose become indebted in any manner to an amount
exceeding one and one-half per centum of the
taxable property in such county, city, town,
school district, or other municipal corporation,
without the assent of three fifths of the voters
therein voting at an election to be held for
that purpose, nor in cases requiring such
assent shall the total indebtedness at any time
exceed five per centum on the value of the taxSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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able property therein to be ascertained be the
last assessment for state and county purposes
previous to the incurring of such indebtedness,
except that in incorporated cities the assessment
shall be taken from the last assessment for city
purposes. * * *" (Emphasis supplied)
and the assessn1ents at the time involved in this case
were made in harmony with Remington's Code, Section 9112, which required that "all property shall be
assessed at not to exceed fifty per cent of its true and
fair value in money." The court found that:
"The conditions of our problem are such that
if the assessed value so fixed upon which taxes
were to be computed is the amount which is to
become the basis for computation of the constitutional debt limit, then it may be conceded that
the 5 per cent debt limit was exceeded in the incurring of a considerable portion of the debts
here involved. On the other hand, it is plain
from the record before us that if the real value
of the property within the city as determined
by the assessing officers for the years in question is to become the basis for computation of
the 5 per cent debt limit, then such debt limit
was not exceeded in the incurring of any of the
indebtedness here involved."
The court deterr.ained that the meaning of the
constitutional limitation was that the full value be
used as the basis of calculations.
The Montana Supreme Court likewise decided
the issue in State v. Board of Commissioners of Hill
County, 185 Pac. 456 (1919). Section 5 of Article
13 of the State Constitution provided:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
"No county shall be allo·wed to become indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to an
amount, including existing indebtedness, in the
aggregate exceeding five ( 5) per centum of the
( \~alue of the) taxable property therein, tO'be
ascertained by the last assessment for state and
county taxes previous to the incurring of such
indebtedness." (Emphasis supplied)
The court said :
"At the time the Constitution was drafted, the
statute provided that all taxable property should
be assessed at its full cash value (section 1673,
Fifth Div. Comp. Stat. 1887), and the same statute has been in force continuously since (section 2502, Rev. Codes). In view of this declaration of the public policy of the state, the language of the Constitution above must be construed to mean that the limit of county indebtedness is 5 per cent of the value of the taxable property as that value is disclosed by the assessment
roll; and since the only value which appears on
the assessment roll is the value fixed by the
county assessor as equalized by the county and
state boards of equalization - that is, the full
cash value- the expressions 'value of taxable
property' and 'assessed valuation' mean the
same thing.
"Chapter 51, Laws of 1919, has nothing whatever to do with the assessment of property or the
determination of the assessed valuation. It deals
only with the imposition of taxes after the assessment roll is completed and in the hands of
the county clerk. Its provisions are directed to
the clerk, and the extension of the taxes by him
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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involves only a matter of mathematical calculation- a mere ministerial duty. Hilger v. Moore,
56 Mont. -182 Pac. 477.
"Under the provisions of the constitution
above, the limit of indebtedness is computed
upon the assessed valuation as disclosed by the
last assessment roll, and not upon the percentage
of value upon which taxes are computed. The
language is too plain to admit or doubt or to
require the citation of authorities to support the
conclusion; but, under like constitutional provisions, the same rule of construction has been applied in other states. Halsey & Co. v. Belle
Plaine, 128 Iowa 467, 104 N.W. 494; Hansen v.
Hoquiam, 95 Wash. 132, 163 Pac. 391." (Emphasis supplied)
In a similar situation the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in Flanigan v. Police Jury of Jackson Parish, 82 So. 722, ( 1919) held on original hearing that
since the proposed indebtedness exceeded the constitutional debt limit of 10o/o ("one-tenth of assessed
valuation of the property within such minicipal, parish, or drainage district, as shown by the last assessment.") bonds could not be issued. On rehearing the
court reversed this position and held :
"In the present case we believe that by 'as·sessed valuation' the framers of the Constitution meant only the listing and valuing of the
property as a basis upon which taxes were to be
collected, and that they did not intend to include
in that term the further process of the calculation of the amount to be paid by the taxpayers.
In other words, the value written into the roll
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the assessor to represent the property, and
the one factor in the process of taxation which
remains constant for all purposes, save to the
extent that it may be modified by the police jury
as a board of reviewers, or by the board of state
affairs, in the exercise of its powers of review,
is the actual value fixed by the board. The proceedings from the assessor to the board are but
steps in the reaching or fixing of that assessed
valuation. When the roll and valuation is thus
completed, each subdivision sits down to calculate its alimony according to its needs. The actual value used is the same for all, and, we think,
the true assessed value within the meaning of
article 281 of the Constitution. Halsey v. Belle
Plaine, 128 Iowa 467, 104 N.W. 494.';
The plaintiff does not deny that certain other
jurisdictions have held that debt limits are to be computed on the basis of the assessed value of the property in the district. However, plaintiff believes that
these cases should be distinguished on the ground that
the language there being interpreted used the words
"assessed value" rather than "value as ascertained by the last previous assessment." Such was
the fact in State v. Tolly, 16 S.E. 195 (South Carolina, 1892) ;smith v:-Alistin, 76 So. 404 (Alabama,
1917), and Phelps v. City of Minneapolis, 219 N.W.
872 (Minnesota, 1928). In State v. Clausen, 199 Pac.
752 ( 1921), the Supreme Court of Washington held
that where the statutory language said "assessed
valuation," that figure was to be used in determining
the debt limit in view of the fact that the legislature
had inserted the word "assessed" with the apparent
intention of changing the law to make it include said
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basis rather than the full value basis which it had
included as determined by Hansen v. Hoquiam,
supra. In the cases which plaintiff has cited in favor
of the proposition that full value should govern, it
should be noted that the phrase which set the basis
was the same as, or similar to, the language in the
Utah Constitution and that the word "assessed" did
not precede the word "value" except in the Louisiana
case where, even then, the court held that the full
value should govern.
In these cases upholding the "full value" theory
the courts relied heavily on the fact that at the time
the state constitutions were adopted, the law required
assessments to be at full cash value. Indeed, until
such time as a state had been in existence for many
years it could not be expected that assessments would
be substantially lower than that amount. It has been
common to the history of a large number of states that
as a matter of practice assessments gradually become
lower than the actual value of property assessed over
a period of years. So, at the time of the adoption of a
constitution it is hardly likely that the framers thereof would anticipate a situ;;:ttion in which assessments
would be less than full value. This indeed was the
case in Utah where the territorial law explicitely required full value assessments. See Compiled Laws of
Utah 1888, page 720, Section 2010:
"Property other than money shall be assessed
at a fair cash valuation ... "
Page 724, Section 2024, Compiled Laws of Utah 1888
requires that the assessor ascertain all property in
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the county, "real and personal, subject to taxation
... and (he) shall determine the fair cash value of
such property, and shall so list and assess the same
to the person, firm, corporation, association or company ovvning or having the possession, charge, or control thereof, and make returns to the county court."
Such a requirement was carried into the Revised
Statutes of 1898, Section 2506, which provides: "all
taxable property must be assessed at its full cash
value." This language appeared in the Compiled
Laws of 1907, Section 2506, in the Compiled Laws of
1917, Section 5866 and, until1947, in the Ut~h Code
Annotated 1943, Section 80-5-1. Thus, it is shown
that at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution in 1895 and for many years thereafter the full
cash value was the standard upon which assessments
were made, and consequently it vvas this value which
was used as a basis for determining the constitutional
debt limit. The effect of the 1947 amendment reducing assessed valuations by sixty per cent was soon
found to have had the effect of reducing the debt incurring powers of school districts by the same percentage and to make impossible the carrying out of
necessary school construction programs. The Legislature in amending Section 75-13-12 in 1951 was
merely endeavoring to restore to school districts the
full debt incurring power granted them by the constitution.
While it is not plaintiff's contention that the
1947 amendment to Section 80-5-1 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, is unconstitutional, it may nevertheless be unconstitutional. Two years after the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
adoption of the present constitution the Utah Supreme Court in State ex rei Cunningham v. Thomas,
16 U. 86, 50 Pac. 615 ( 1897) indicated that there
might be a constitutional requirement that assessments be at full value. The case concerned the right
of the State Board of Equalization so to raise the total
valuation of the property of any county in the state
as to increase the aggregate valuation of all the counties in the state. In determining that the Board had
this power, the court considered Article 13, Section
2 of the Constitution, which required that all tangible
property in the state not exempt under the laws of
the United States or of the Utah Constitution "be
taxed in proportion to its value to be extended as provided by law," and Section 3, which said:
"The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation
on all property in the state, according to its value
in money, and shall prescribe by general law
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of all property; so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion
to the value of his, her, or its property."
The court said:
"This provision is closely related to the one
in section 2, and directs the legislature not only
to provide a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, so that every subject owning
property shall pay the same rate of tax as every
other such subject, but also declares that all
property shall be assessed at a basis which shall
be 'according to its value in money.' It is evident
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that the term 'according to its value in money'
means that all property shall be valued, for the
purposes of assessment, as near as is reasonably
practicable, at its full cash value; in other words,
that the valuation for assessment and taxation
shall be, as near as reasonably practicable, equal
to the cash price for which the property valued
would sell in open market, for this is doubtless
the correct test of the value of property." (Emphasis supplied)
The court also said:
"'All taxable property must be assessed at its
full cash value. Land and the improvements
thereon must be separately assessed.' As will
be observed, there is nothing in either of these
sections of the statute ·which conflicts \vith the
provisions of sections 2 and 3 of the constitution.
Under Section 5, all taxable property must be
assessed at its full cash value; but, as we have
seen, this is so under the constitution, and, as
to assessing land and improvements separately,
there is nothing in the constitution to prevent
it."
It should be noted that plaintiff's position, if accepted by the court, will not violate the constitutional
requirement that taxes and assessments be uniform.
Uniformity in assessments and taxes will not be affected whether assessments be made at full cash value
or at 407o thereof so long as made equally throughout
the state.
It is not necessary that the consti tu tionali ty of
the 1947 amendment to Section 80-5-1 of the Utah
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Code Annotated, 1943, be decided here, because the
question in issue has to do with the determination
of the meaning of the constitutional debt limit provision, and this meaning should be determined without
reference to subsequent acts of the Legislature which
concern only the mechanics of determining the
amount of taxes to be paid on property of a given
value.
Plaintiff contends that in changing these mechanics by providing for a 40% assessment the Legislature did not intend to change the substantive limit
to which political subdivisions may incur debt so as
to put it out of the Legislature's power to restore that
full limit to the aforesaid political subdivisions. It
may be that the Legislature could reduce this limit
by statute if it so desired, but plaintiff urges that no
such result should be implied here in the absence of
a statutory provision so requiring. Indeed, the 1951
amendment to Section 75-13-12 is a clear expression
of legislative intent that the debt limit not be so reduced.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, plaintiff argues that his prayer for
a writ of mandamus compelling defendant clerk to
sign the bonds in question should be granted for the
following reasons: ( 1) The total debt of the district,
including the aforesaid bonds, will not exceed the
statutory limit of four per cent of the reasonable fair
cash value of the property in the district as provided
in Section 75-13-12 of the Utah Code Annotated,
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1943, as amended. (2) This statute as amended is
not unconstitutional in fixing the fair cash value
rather than the assessed value as the basis for computing debt limit. (3) The constitution, Article 8,
Section 4, requires only that school district indebtedness not exceed four per cent of the reasonable fair
cash value of the taxable property therein; to interpret it otherwise would cause the constitutional debt
limit to vary with the statutory assessment rate and
would violate the substantive intent of the Constitution of Utah as framed and as adopted by the people.
ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH
Appearing as Attorneys for Plaintiff
1409 Walker Bank Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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